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Abstract
The market practice of extrapolating different term structures from different instru-
ments lacks a rigorous justification in terms of cash flows structure and market observables.
In this paper, we integrate our previous consistent theory for pricing under credit, collat-
eral and funding risks into term structure modelling, integrating the origination of different
term structures with such effects. Under a number of assumptions on collateralization,
wrong-way risk, gap risk, credit valuation adjustments and funding effects, including the
treasury operational model, and via an immersion hypothesis, we are able to derive a syn-
thetic master equation for the multiple term structure dynamics that integrates multiple
curves with credit/funding adjustments.
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1 Introduction
Starting from summer 2007, with the spreading of the credit crunch, market quotes of forward
rates and zero-coupon bonds began to violate standard no-arbitrage relationships. This was
partly due to the liquidity crisis affecting credit lines, and to the possibility of a systemic
break-down triggered by increased counterparty credit risk. Indeed, credit risk is only one
facet of the problem, since the crisis started as a funding liquidity crisis, as shown for example
by Eisenschmidt and Tapking [2009], and it continued as a credit crisis following a typical
spiral pattern as described in Brunnermeier and Pedersen [2009].
This has been the most dramatic signal for inadequacy of standard financial modelling
based on idealized assumptions on risk-free rates and on unrestricted access to funding in-
struments. Removing or relaxing such assumptions opens the door to financial models able to
analyze the inner mechanics of a deal: collateral rules, funding policies, close-out procedures,
market fees, among others. Such features require to be included in our pricing framework.
A few papers in the financial literature have tried either to re-define the theory from
scratch or to extend the standard framework to the new world. The works of Cre´pey [2011,
2012a,b] open the path towards a pricing theory based on different bank accounts, accruing
at different rates, and representing the different cash sources one may have at her disposal to
implement the hedging strategies, the funding policies and the margining rules. We cite also
the works by Piterbarg [2010, 2012], which focus on perfectly collateralized deals and try to
reformulate the basic Black Scholes theory, and the works of Burgard and Kjaer [2011a,b].
On the other hand, the works of Pallavicini et al. [2011, 2012] stress the fact that all updated
features can be included in terms of modified payoffs rather than through the need of a new
and somehow ad-hoc pricing theory. In particular, Pallavicini et al. [2011, 2012] recognize
that a financial contract must include hedging, funding and margining fees as specific and
precisely defined additional cash flows.
In this paper we try to distill the above contributions to highlight the common ingredients
that a new pricing framework should include to be effective in a world where credit and
liquidity issues cannot be disregarded. We formulate a term structure theory that is based on
the new pricing framework and that leads quite naturally to multiple curves. The cornerstone
of our analysis will be market procedures and market observables. We avoid employing
pricing rules that are not supported by market strategies. For example, funding requires a
counterparty willing to lend cash to the investor, hedging requires trading only the instruments
offered by the market, and so on. On the other hand, we wish to maintain the discussion as
simple as possible and to use well developed pricing and hedging concepts as much as possible,
so that we still use some theoretical quantities, such as a risk-neutral measure and a risk free
rate. However, we use such unobservables only as instrumental variables and we check that
our final results are independent of them. Our final multiple-curves term structure theory,
rigorously integrated in terms of credit, collateral and funding effects, will be based only on
market observables and market procedures.
In particular, we wish to analyze concrete pricing cases such as partial collateralized deals
and contracts cleared by Central Clearing Counterparties (CCP), which is a very sensitive
topic following pressure from Dodd Frank and EMIR/CRD4. See for instance Arnsdorf [2011],
Pirrong [2011], Cont et al. [2011], and Heller and Vause [2012].
We now move to describing more in detail the content of the paper.
In Section 2 we present our pricing framework along with realistic approximations.
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We start by pointing out that the classical relationship between LIBOR forward rates and
zero coupon bonds is not working anymore. In particular, interpreting the zero-coupon curves
as risk-free rate curves is no longer tenable. Likewise, interpreting the LIBOR rates as the
simply compounded rates that underlie risk-free one-period swaps does not work anymore.
To include risks that are now heavily affecting interest rates, we design a theory that includes
explicit cash flows accounting for default close-out and also for costs of funding for the hedging
portfolio, and costs of funding for collateral (margining).
In particular, we assume that LIBOR is now a rate assigned by the market and not derived
by risk-free forward rate agreements or risk-free one-period swaps.
By including credit, collateral and funding effects in valuation we obtain the master equa-
tion seen earlier in Pallavicini et al. [2011, 2012]. In the specific case where collateral is a
fraction of current all-inclusive mark-to-market, we obtain a simpler pricing equation based
on a hedge-funding-fees equivalent measure and on a generalized dividend process inclusive
of default risk, treasury funding and collateral costs. We do not consider collateral gap risk
for interest-rate products, as such risks are not essential for this asset class, as described in
Brigo et al. [2011b] (contrary to credit derivatives, as seen in Brigo et al. [2011a]).
In Section 3 we apply these approximations to the money market, in order to evaluate
collateralized interest-rate derivatives.
We look at defining new building blocks that will replace the old unobservables-based
ones (such as risk-free rate zero-coupon bonds, risk-free one-period swap rates, etc). Such
new instruments are based on the collateral rate, which is an observable rate, since it is
contractually defined by the CSA as the rate to be used in the margining procedure. The
collateralized zero-coupon bond can be proxied by one-period Overnight Indexed Swaps (or
by quantities bootstrapped from multi-period OIS) when we accept to approximate a daily
compounded rate with continuously compounded rates. We then define fair OIS rates at
inception in terms of collateralized zero coupon bonds.
Thus, this setup allows us to define new LIBOR forward rates as equilibrium rates in
collateralized one-period swaps.
The resulting rates depend on the collateralized coupon-bearing bonds. We may also
define a collateral based forward measure where LIBOR forward rates are expected values
of future realized LIBOR rates. We then hint at the development of a market model theory
for the new collateral-inclusive LIBOR forward rates and to a forward rates theory for the
OIS-based instantaneous forward rates.
This is where the multiple curve picture finally shows up: we have a curve with LIBOR
based forward rates, that are collateral adjusted expectation of LIBOR market rates we take as
primitive rates from the market, and we have instantaneous forward rates that are OIS based
rates. OIS rates are driven by collateral fees, whereas LIBOR forward rates are driven both
by collateral rates and by the primitive LIBOR market rates.
We conclude this section by introducing a dynamical multiple-curve model for OIS and
LIBOR rates. We reformulate the parsimonious HJM model by Moreni and Pallavicini [2010,
2012] under our new pricing framework.
In Section 4 we focus on uncollateralized, partially-collateralized and over-collateralized
contracts.
We remove perfect collateralization and adopt a partial one. This means that now we
need to evaluate the pricing adjustment by including also the corrections coming from the
treasury and hedging strategy funding costs.
In particular, we have that LIBOR forward rates associated to partially collateralized
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one-period swap contracts acquire a covariance term that can be interpreted as a convexity
adjustment.
CCPs can be modelled in the above framework and, in particular, initial margins can be
roughly modelled with a collateral fraction larger than unity. This leads to a generalization
of the previous immersion-based general formula.
In Section 5 we discuss how to model credit spreads, funding rates and specific assumptions
on the fraction of mark-to-market covered by collateral.
Credit spreads should be calibrated via Credit Default Swaps or Defaultable Bonds. How-
ever, this should be a global calibration because CDS are collateralized and are in principle
priced with the same general formula, inclusive of collateral and funding, that we use for all
other deals. Bonds are not collateralized and are funded more heavily, so funding risk is also
there. This global CDS or Bond calibration is not done usually even though interpreting
CDS or Bonds as sources of pure credit risk calibration may lead to important errors, see for
example Fujii and Takahashi [2011b] or Brigo et al. [2011a].
The term structure of funding rates depends on the funding policy and is model dependent.
Stripping it directly from market liquid instruments is very difficult, especially because the
interbank market is no longer (fully) representative of such costs. Collateral portfolios play
now a key role too. Default intensities, collateral rates and liquidity bases will be key drivers
of the funding spreads. Finally, we consider using Value-at-Risk measures to determine the
effective fraction of mark-to-market we should hold as collateral, and introduce collateral
haircuts.
Our final interest-rate curves are consistently explained by such effects and based on
market observables.
In Section 6 we conclude the discussion and list open points.
2 Valuation under Credit, Collateral and Funding risk
After the onset of the crisis in 2007, all market instruments are quoted by taking into account,
more or less implicitly, credit and funding liquidity adjustments. Hence we have to carefully
check standard theoretical assumptions which often ignore credit and liquidity issues. We
must go back to market data by limiting ourselves to price only derivative contracts we
are able to replicate by means of market instruments. The comparison to market data and
processes is the only means we have to validate our theoretical assumptions, so as to drop
them if in contrast with observations.
Our general results are not linked to a particular asset class, but in this paper we focus
as main example on interest-rate derivatives, as a paradigmatic case.
2.1 The Credit Crunch
Classical interest-rate models were formulated to satisfy no-arbitrage relationships by con-
struction, which allow to hedge forward-rate agreements in terms of risk-free zero-coupon
bonds.
Starting from summer 2007, with the spreading of the credit crunch, market quotes of
forward rates and zero-coupon bonds began to violate usual no-arbitrage relationships. The
main driver of such behavior was the liquidity crisis reducing the credit lines along with the
fear of an imminent systemic break-down. As a result the impact of counterparty risk on
market prices could not be considered negligible any more.
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This is the first of many examples of relationships that broke down with the crisis. As-
sumptions and approximations stemming from pricing theory should be replaced by strategies
implemented with market instruments. For instance, inclusion of credit valuation adjustments
(CVA) for interest-rate instruments, such as those analyzed in Brigo and Pallavicini [2007],
breaks the relationship between risk-free zero coupon bonds and LIBOR forward rates. Also,
funding in domestic currency on different time horizons must include counterparty risk ad-
justments and liquidity issues, see Filipovic and Trolle [2012], breaking again this relationship.
We thus have
Ft(T0, T1) 6= 1
T1 − T0
(
Pt(T0)
Pt(T1)
− 1
)
,
where Pt(T ) is a zero coupon bond price at time t for maturity T , and F is the related LIBOR
forward rate. A direct consequence is the impossibility to describe all LIBOR rates in terms
of a unique zero-coupon yield curve. Indeed, since 2009 and even earlier, we had evidence
that the money market for the Euro area was moving to a multi-curve setting. See Ametrano
and Bianchetti [2009], Henrard [2009], Kijima et al. [2009], Mercurio [2009, 2010], Pallavicini
and Tarenghi [2010], and Fujii and Takahashi [2011a].
A further example of evolving assumptions is given by the use of collateralized contracts.
The growing attention on counterparty credit risk is transforming OTC derivatives money
markets. An increasing number of derivative contracts is cleared by CCPs, while most of the
remaining contracts are traded under collateralization, regulated by Credit Support Annex
(CSA). Both cleared and CSA deals require collateral posting, as default insurance, along
with its remuneration. We cannot neglect such effects.
As a consequence, once a derivative contract is closed, we must consider the cash flows
associated to the collateral margining procedure. Thus, a zero-coupon contract behaves as a
dividend paying asset, and its discounted price is no longer a martingale, namely
V ZCt
Bt
6= Et
[
V ZCT
BT
]
,
where V ZCt is the zero-coupon contract’s price and B is the risk-free rate bank account, the
numeraire of the risk neutral measure.
2.2 A New Pricing Framework
In order to price a financial product (for example a derivative contract), we have to discount
all the cash flows occurring after the trading position is entered. We can group them as
follows:
1. product cash flows (e.g. coupons, dividends, premiums, etc.) inclusive of hedging
instruments cash flows;
2. cash flows required by the collateral margining procedure;
3. cash flows required by the funding and investing (borrowing and lending) procedures;
4. cash flows occurring upon default (close-out procedure).
We refer to the two names involved in the financial contract and subject to default risk
as investor (also called name “I”, usually the bank) and counterparty (also called name “C”,
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for example a corporate client, but also another bank). We denote by τI ,and τC respectively
the default times of the investor and counterparty. We fix the portfolio time horizon T > 0,
and fix the risk-neutral pricing model (Ω,G,Q), with a filtration (Gt)t∈[0,T ] such that τC , τI
are (Gt)t∈[0,T ]-stopping times. We denote by Et[ · ] the conditional expectation under Q given
Gt, and by Eτi [ · ] the conditional expectation under Q given the stopped filtration Gτi . We
exclude the possibility of simultaneous defaults, and define the first default event between the
two parties as the stopping time
τ := τC ∧ τI .
We will also consider the market sub-filtration (Ft)t≥0 that one obtains implicitly by assuming
a separable structure for the complete market filtration (Gt)t≥0. Gt is then generated by the
pure default-free market filtration Ft and by the filtration generated by all the relevant default
times monitored up to t (see for example Bielecki and Rutkowski [2002]).
The price V¯t of a derivative, inclusive of collateralized credit and debit risk (CVA and
DVA), margining costs, and funding and investing costs can be derived by following Pallavicini
et al. [2011, 2012], and is given by the following master equation:
V¯t(C,F ) = Et[ Π(t, T ∧ τ) + γ(t, T ∧ τ ;C) + ϕ(t, T ∧ τ ;F ) ] (1)
+ Et
[
1{t<τ<T}D(t, τ)θτ (C, ε)
]
,
where
• Π(t, T ) is the sum of all discounted payoff terms in the interval (t, T ], without credit
or debit risk, without funding costs and without collateral cash flows. In other terms,
these are the financial instrument cash flows without additional risks.
• γ(t, T ;C) are the collateral margining costs cash flows within the interval (t, T ], C being
the collateral account.
• ϕ(t, T ;F ) are the funding and investing costs cash flows within such interval, F being
the cash account part of the hedging strategy needed for trading, and
• θτ (C, ε) is the on-default cash flow, ε being the residual value of the claim being traded
at default, also interpreted as the replacement cost for the deal at default (close-out
amount). It is primarily this term that originates the familiar Credit and Debit Valua-
tion Adjustments (CVA/DVA) terms.
We also need to define D(t, τ). Notation D(t, u) in general will denote the risk-neutral
default-free and funding-free discount factor, given by the ratio
D(t, u) = Bt/Bu , Bt = rtBtdt ,
where B is the bank account numeraire, driven by the risk free instantaneous interest rate r
and associated to the risk neutral measure Q. This rate r is assumed to be (Ft)t∈[0,T ] adapted
and is the key variable in all pre-crisis term structure modelling, since all other interest rates
and bonds could be defined as a function of r, see for example Brigo and Mercurio [2006].
Remark 2.1. (Risk-Free Rates and Risk-Neutral Measures). We consider rt and the
related numeraire Bt and measure Q as unobservables, and will derive the theory based on
them, showing that the final equations will only depend on market observables.
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The margining procedure and the liquidity policy dictate respectively the dynamics of
the collateral account Ct and of the funding cash account Ft, while the close-out amount
εt is defined by the CSA that has been agreed between the deal parties. Common market
procedures, as we will see later on, may link the values of such processes to the price of the
product itself, transforming the previous definition of Equation (1) into a recursive equation.
This feature is hidden in simplified approaches based on adding a spread to the discount
curve to accommodate collateral and funding costs. A different approach is followed by
Cre´pey [2011], who extends the usual risk-neutral evaluation framework to include many
cash accounts accruing at different rates. Despite the different initial approach, a structure
that is similar to our result above for the derivative price is obtained as a solution of a
backward SDE.
2.3 A Compact Formulation in Continuous Time
The results of Pallavicini et al. [2011, 2012] allow to define in an explicit way coupons and
costs in terms of the collateral process Ct and close-out value ετ . The authors proceed by
defining a sequence of margining, funding and hedging operations, and account for their costs.
Such operations are taken on discrete time-grids.
Since we are going to apply the Pallavicini et al. [2011, 2012] master equation to interest-
rate derivatives, where collateralization usually happens on a daily basis, and where gap risk
is not large, we prefer to present such results on a continuous time-grid. Furthermore, we
assume that collateral re-hypothecation is allowed, as done in practice. See Brigo et al. [2011b]
for a discussion on re-hypothecation. We write
Π(t, u) =
∫ u
t
dpivD(t, v) , γ(t, u;C) =
∫ u
t
dv (rv − c˜v)CvD(t, v) ,
ϕ(t, u;F,H) =
∫ u
t
dv (rv − f˜v)(V¯v(C,F )− Cv)D(t, v)
−
∫ u
t
dv (rv − h˜v)HvD(t, v) ,
where pit is the derivative coupon process, and the collateral, funding and market rates are
defined as
c˜t := c
+
t 1{Ct>0}+c
−
t 1{Ct<0} , f˜t := f
+
t 1{Ft>0}+f
−
t 1{Ft<0} , h˜t := h
+
t 1{Ht>0}+h
−
t 1{Ht<0} ,
with c± defined in the CSA contract, f± defined by the treasury, and h± equal to the growth
rate of market instruments traded to implement the hedging strategy, see Pallavicini et al.
[2012] for full details.
We can plug the above definitions into equation (1) and, by following Pallavicini et al.
[2012], we are able to write the following continuous-time pricing equation.
V¯t(C;F ) :=
∫ T
t
Eh˜t
[ (
1{u<τ}dpiu + 1{τ∈du}θu(C, ε)
)
D(t, u; f˜)
]
(2)
+
∫ T
t
duEh˜t
[
1{u<τ}(f˜u − c˜u)CuD(t, u; f˜ )
]
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with, in case of collateral re-hypothecation,
θτ (C, ε) := ετ − 1{τC<τI}LGDC(ετ − Cτ−)+ − 1{τI<τC}LGDI(ετ − Cτ−)− ,
where we use the notation x− = min(x, 0), and where 1{τC<τI}LGDC(ετ − Cτ−)+ originates
the CVA type term after collateralization, with 1{τI<τC}LGDI(ετ −Cτ−)− originating the DVA
type term instead. The above expectations are taken under a pricing measure Qh˜ under which
the underlying risk factors grow at a rate h˜, and the discount factors are defined as given by
D(t, T ;x) := exp
{
−
∫ T
t
duxu
}
.
Notice that the above pricing equation 2 is not suited for explicit numerical evaluations,
since the right-hand side is still depending on the derivative price via the indicators within the
collateral, funding and market rates. We could resort to numerical solutions, as in Cre´pey
et al. [2012a], but, since our goal is pricing interest-rate derivatives, we prefer to further
specialize the pricing equation for such deals.
In order to further specialize our master equation 2, we aim to write the price as an
expectation over the derivative discounted cash flows. This is achieved by adopting a few
further assumptions. In particular, we assume that gap risk is not present, and we consider
a particular form for collateral and close-out prices, namely
Ct
.
= αtV¯t(C,F ) , ετ
.
= V¯τ (C,F )
with 0 ≤ αt ≤ 1. This means that
(i) Collateral is a fraction αt of the all-inclusive mark-to-market.
(ii) Close-out is the all-inclusive mark-to-market at the first default time.
This approach is considered in Biffis et al. [2011] and in the longevity-risk chapter of Brigo
et al. [2012]. An alternative approximation, not imposing a proportionality between the
account pricing processes, and suited for contracts with gap risk, such as CDS, can be found
in Pallavicini [2013].
We obtain, by switching to the market filtration F ,
V¯t(C;F ) = 1{τ>t}
∫ T
t
Eh˜t
[
dpiuD(t, u; f˜ + λ)
∣∣F ] (3)
− 1{τ>t}
∫ T
t
duEh˜t
[
(ζ˜u − λu)V¯u(C,F )D(t, u; f˜ + λ)
∣∣F ]
with Et[ ·|F ] := E[·|Ft], and we define
ζ˜t := (1− αt)
(
λC<It LGDC1{V¯t(C;F )>0} + λ
I<C
t LGDI1{V¯t(C;F )<0}
)
− αt(f˜t − c˜t) , (4)
where LGDC and LGDI are the loss given default respectively of the counterparty and the
investor, and the default intensities are defined as
1{τ>t}λ
C<I
t dt := Et
[
1{τ∈dt}1{τC<τI}
]
, 1{τ>t}λ
I<C
t dt := Et
[
1{τ∈dt}1{τI<τC}
]
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so that
1{τ>t}λt dt := Et
[
1{τ∈dt}
]
= 1{τ>t}(λ
C<I
t + λ
I<C
t ) dt .
Hence, it is possible to apply again the Feynman-Kac theorem to obtain a differential
equation, which can be solved to obtain
V¯t(C;F ) = 1{τ>t}
∫ T
t
Eh˜t
[
dpiuD(t, u; f˜ + ζ˜)
∣∣F ] . (5)
As a last step we can specialize further the above pricing equation to two extreme cases.
• Perfect collateralization, namely αt = 1, and
V¯t(C;F ) = 1{τ>t}
∫ T
t
Eh˜t
[
dpiuD(t, u; c˜)
∣∣F ] . (6)
• No collateralization, namely αt = 0.
V¯t(C;F ) = 1{τ>t}
∫ T
t
Eh˜t
[
dpiuD(t, u; f˜ + λ˜)
∣∣F ] (7)
with
λ˜t = λ
C<I
t LGDC1{V¯t(C;F )>0} + λ
I<C
t LGDI1{V¯t(C;F )<0} .
3 Pricing Collateralized Interest-Rate Derivatives
All liquid market quotes on the money market corresponds to instruments with daily collat-
eralization at overnight rate (et), both for the investor and the counterparty, namely
c˜t
.
= et .
Notice that the collateral accrual rate is symmetric, so that we no longer have a dependency
of the accrual rates on the collateral price.
We will describe some of these instruments, such as OIS and IRS, along with their under-
ling market rates, in the following sections. At the moment of writing this paper the market is
moving from OTC contracts regulated by a (standardized) bilateral CSA to a market cleared
by CCPs. We will see in Section 4.3 how this change will affect the pricing of money-market
instruments, while in this section we assume the bilateral view.
We use such instruments as building blocks to implement the hedging strategies for ex-
otic interest-rate derivatives. Thus, the borrowing and lending rates h˜t will be determined
according to the quotes of OIS and IRS products, which in turn depend on the overnight rate
et.
In the following sections, we adopt the perfect collateralization approximation of Equa-
tion (6) to derive the pricing equations for OIS and IRS products, then we show how to
calculate the value of the market rates h˜t.
Furthermore, we assume that daily collateralization can be considered as a perfect con-
tinuous collateralization, and, in particular, we disregard gap risk. See Brigo et al. [2011b]
for a discussion on the impact of partial collateralization on interest-rate derivatives.
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3.1 Overnight Rates and OIS
The money market usually quotes the prices of collateralized instruments. In particular, a
daily collateralization procedure is assumed, so that CSA contracts require that the collat-
eral account be remunerated at the overnight rate (et). In particular, the money market
usually quotes the price of Overnight Indexed Swaps (OIS). Such contracts exchange a fix-
payment leg with a floating leg paying the same overnight rate used for their collateralization,
compounded daily. Since we are going to price OIS under the assumption of perfect collat-
eralization, namely we are assuming that daily collateralization may be viewed as done on a
continuous basis, we approximate also daily compounding in OIS floating leg with continuous
compounding, which is reasonable when there is no gap risk, and we can write the one-period
OIS payoff with maturity T and tenor x as given by
1 + xK − exp
{∫ T
T−x
du eu
}
where K is the fixed rate payed by the OIS. Furthermore, we can introduce the (par) fix
rates Et(T, x; e) that make the one-period OIS contract fair, namely priced at 0. They are
implicitly defined as
V¯ OISt (K) := E
h˜
t
[(
1 + xK − exp
{∫ T
T−x
du eu
})
D(t, T ; e)
∣∣F ]
with
V¯ OISt (Et(T, x; e)) = 0
leading to
Et(T, x; e) :=
1
x
(
Pt(T − x; e)
Pt(T ; e)
− 1
)
where we define collateralized zero-coupon bonds1 as
Pt(T ; e) := E
h˜
t
[
D(t, T ; e)
∣∣F ] . (8)
One-period OIS rates Et(T, x; e), along with multi-period ones, are actively traded on
the market. Notice that we can bootstrap collateralized zero-coupon bond prices from OIS
quotes.
Remark 3.1. (Hedging by means of OIS contracts). Exotic interest-rate products may
be hedged with a strategy containing (one-period) OIS contracts. In particular, the corre-
sponding borrowing/lending rate h˜t will be equal to the growth rate of the (one-period) OIS
contract
h˜OISt V¯
OIS
t dt
.
= Eh˜t
[
dV¯ OISt
∣∣F ] = etV¯ OISt dt
where we notice that we obtain a symmetric rate, namely the same for going long or short in
OIS contracts when hedging. The extension to multi-period contracts is straightforward.
1Notice that we are only defining a price process for hypothetical collateralized zero-coupon bond. We are
not assuming that collateralized bonds are assets traded on the market.
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3.2 LIBOR Rates
LIBOR rates (Lt(T )) are the indices used as reference rate for many collateralized interest-
rate derivatives (IRS, basis swaps, . . . ). In particular we consider Interest Rate Swaps (IRS).
IRS contracts swap a fix-payment leg with a floating leg paying simply compounded LIBOR
rates. IRS contracts are collateralized at overnight rate et. Thus, a one-period IRS payoff
with maturity T and tenor x is given by
xK − xLT−x(T )
where K is the fix rate payed by the IRS. Furthermore, we can introduce the (par) fix rates
Ft(T, x; e) which render the one-period IRS contract fair, i.e. priced at zero. They are
implicitly defined as
V¯ IRSt (K) := E
h˜
t
[
(xK − xLT−x(T ))D(t, T ; e)
∣∣F ]
with
V¯ IRSt (Ft(T, x; e)) = 0
leading to
Ft(T, x; e) :=
Eh˜t
[
LT−x(T )D(t, T ; e)
∣∣F ]
Eh˜t
[
D(t, T ; e)
∣∣F ] =
Eh˜t
[
LT−x(T )D(t, T ; e)
∣∣F ]
Pt(T ; e)
The above definition may be simplified by a suitable choice of the measure under which we
take the expectation. In particular, we can consider the following Radon-Nikodym derivative
dQh˜,T ;e
dQh˜
∣∣∣∣∣
t
:= Eh˜t
[
D(0, T ; e)
∣∣F ] = D(0, t; e)Pt(T ; e)
which is a positive Qh˜-martingale. We name the corresponding equivalent measure the col-
lateralized T -forward measure Eh˜,T ;et [ · ].
Thus, for any payoff φT , perfectly collateralized at overnight rate et, we can express prices
as expectations under the collateralized T -forward measure, and we get
Eh˜t
[
φTD(t, T ; e)
∣∣F ] = Pt(T ; e)Eh˜,T ;et [φT ∣∣F ]
In particular, we can write LIBOR forward rates as
Ft(T, x; e) :=
Eh˜t
[
LT−x(T )D(t, T ; e)
∣∣F ]
Eh˜t
[
D(t, T ; e)
∣∣F ] = Eh˜,T ;et
[
LT−x(T )
∣∣F ] (9)
One-period forward rates Ft(T, x; e), along with multi-period ones (swap rates), are ac-
tively traded on the market. Once collateralized zero-coupon bonds are derived, we can
bootstrap forward rate curves from such quotes. See, for instance, Ametrano and Bianchetti
[2009] or Pallavicini and Tarenghi [2010] for a discussion on bootstrapping algorithms.
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Remark 3.2. (Hedging by means of IRS contracts). Exotic interest-rate products may
be hedged with a strategy containing (one-period) IRS contracts. In particular, the correspond-
ing borrowing/lending rate h˜t will be equal to the growth rate of the IRS contract
h˜IRSt V¯
IRS
t dt
.
= Eh˜t
[
dV¯ IRSt
∣∣F ] = etV¯ IRSt dt
where we notice that we obtain a symmetric rate, namely the same for going long or short in
(one-period) IRS contracts when hedging. The extension to multi-period contracts is straight-
forward.
3.3 Modelling Constraints
Our aim is to setup a multiple-curve dynamical model starting from collateralized zero-coupon
bonds Pt(T ; e), and LIBOR forward rates Ft(T, x; e). As we have seen we can bootstrap the
initial curves for such quantities from the market. Now, we wish to propose a dynamics that
preserves the martingale properties satisfied by such quantities.
Thus, without loss of generality, we can define collateralized zero-coupon bonds under the
Qh˜ measure as
dPt(T ; e)
Pt(T ; e)
= et dt− αt(T ; e) · dW h˜t
and LIBOR forward rates under Qh˜,T ;e measure as
dFt(T, x; e) = βt(T, x; e) · dZ h˜,T ;et
where W s and Zs are correlated standard Brownian motions with correlation matrix ρ, and
the volatility processes α and β may depend on bonds and LIBOR forward rates themselves.
The following definition of ft(T, e) is not strictly necessary, and we could keep working
with bonds Pt(T ; e), using their dynamics. However, as it is usual in interest rate theory
to model rates rather than bonds, we may try to formulate quantities that are closer to the
standard HJM framework. In this sense we can define instantaneous forward rates ft(T ; e),
by starting from (collateralized) zero-coupon bonds, as given by
ft(T ; e) := − ∂
∂T
log Pt(T ; e)
We can derive instantaneous forward-rate dynamics by Itoˆ lemma, and we get under Qh˜,T ;e
measure
dft(T ; e) = σt(T ; e) · dW h˜,T ;et , σt(T ; e) :=
∂
∂T
αt(T ; e)
Hence, we can summarize our modelling assumptions in the following way.
1. We choose to hedge exotic options in term of linear collateralized products (OIS, IRS,
. . . ) which we assume to be perfectly collateralized;
2. Since such linear products can be expressed in term of simpler quantities, namely col-
lateralized zero-coupon bonds Pt(T ; e) and LIBOR forward rates Ft(T, x; e), we focus
on their modelling.
3. Initial term structures for collateralized products may be bootstrapped from market
data.
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4. We can write rates dynamics by enforcing suitable martingale properties.
dft(T ; e) = σt(T ; e) · dW h˜,T ;et , dFt(T, x; e) = βt(T, x; e) · dZ h˜,T ;et (10)
As we explained in the introduction, this is where the multiple curve picture finally shows
up: we have a curve with LIBOR based forward rates Ft(T, x; e), that are collateral adjusted
expectation of LIBOR market rates LT−x(T ) we take as primitive rates from the market, and
we have instantaneous forward rates ft(T ; e) that are OIS based rates. OIS rates ft(T ; e)
are driven by collateral fees, whereas LIBOR forward rates Ft(T, x; e) are driven both by
collateral rates and by the primitive LIBOR market rates.
Then, we wish to stress an important property of the above dynamics, namely that it does
not depend on unobservable rates such as the risk-free rate rt.
Once this is done, the framework for multiple curves is ready and we may start populating
the specific dynamics with modelling choices. We propose a possible choice in the following
section.
Remark 3.3. (Introducing a Collateral Measure). When we price exotic interest-rate
derivatives and we hedge by means of OIS or IRS products (we can generalize the argument
to other basic money-market products such as FRA or others), we obtain that the borrow-
ing/lending rate h˜t is equal to the overnight rate et, so that we gets
h˜t
.
= c˜t
.
= et .
Hence, under the previous assumptions we can write the pricing equation (6) as
V¯t(C;F ) = 1{τ>t}
∫ T
t
Eet
[
dpiuD(t, u; e)
∣∣F ]
and we can speak of pricing under a “collateralized measure”. The above equation is formally
equal to the pricing equation of the Black and Scholes theory, see Piterbarg [2012], but here (i)
the collateral rate is specified by the CSA contract and it can be risky; (ii) the pricing measure
is introduced by means of the Feynman-Kac theorem starting from a formulation of the theory
under the risk-neutral measure; (iii) the risk-free rate is not a rate which can be observed
on the market. To avoid confusion we prefer not to explicitly introduce such collateralized
measure.
3.4 Multiple-Curve Collateralized HJM Framework
We can now specialize our modelling assumptions to define a model for interest-rate derivatives
which is flexible enough to calibrate the quotes of the money market, but yet robust. Our
aim is to to define a HJM framework to describe with a single family of Markov processes
all the yield curves we are interested in. We follow Moreni and Pallavicini [2010, 2012] by
reformulating their theory under the Qh˜ measure.
In the literature many authors proposed generalizations of the HJM framework starting,
see for instance Cheyette [2001], Andersen and Andreasen [2002], Carmona [2004], Andreasen
[2006], or Chiarella et al. [2010]. In particular, in recent papers Mart`ınez [2009], Fujii et al.
[2010], Cre´pey et al. [2012b] extended the HJM framework to deal with multiple-yield curves.
See also Mercurio [2010], Mercurio and Xie [2012] for references on LIBOR Market Model.
Let us summarize the basic requirements our model must fulfill (in this section we omit
the dependence on e or h˜ to lighten the notation):
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i) existence of OIS rates, we can describe in term of instantaneous forward rates ft(T );
ii) existence of LIBOR rates, typical underlying of traded derivatives, with associated
forwards Ft(T, x);
iii) no arbitrage dynamics of the ft(T ) and the Ft(T, x) (both being T -forward measure
martingales);
iv) possibility of writing both the ft(T ) and the Ft(T, x) as function of a common family
of Markov processes, so that we are able to build parsimonious yet flexible models.
We stress that our approach models only quantities which can bootstrapped in a model
independent way from market quotes, and it includes natively the margining procedure within
pricing equations. We choose under Qh˜,T ;e measure, the following dynamics.
dft(T ) = σt(T ) · dW Tt (11)
dFt(T, x)
k(T, x) + Ft(T, x)
= Σt(T, x) · dW Tt
where we introduce the families of (stochastic) volatility processes σt(T ) and Σt(T, x), the
vector of independentQh˜,T ;e-Brownian motionsW Tt , and the set of deterministic shifts k(T, x),
such that k(T, x) ≈ 1/x if x ≈ 0. We bootstrap f0(T ) and F0(T, x) from market quotes.
In order to satisfy requirement iv), getting a model with a reduced number of common
driving factors in the spirit of HJM approaches, it is sufficient to conveniently tie together the
volatility processes σt(T ) and Σt(T, x) as in Moreni and Pallavicini [2010]. In doing so, we
extend the single-curve HJM approach of Cheyette [1992], Babbs [1993], Carverhill [1994], and
Ritchken and Sankarasubramanian [1995]. First, we consider a common parametrization for
risk-free and LIBOR forward rate volatilities by introducing the family of stochastic processes
σt(u;T, x) such that
σt(T ) := σt(T ;T, 0) , Σt(T, x) :=
∫ T
T−x
duσt(u;T, x) . (12)
Second, we impose the separability constraint
σt(u;T, x) := vt · (q(u;T, x)g(t, u)) , g(t, u) := exp
{
−
∫ u
t
ds a(s)
}
, q(u;u, 0) := 1 , (13)
where vt is a matrix adapted process, q(u;T, x) and a(t) are deterministic array functions.
The condition on q(u;T, x) when T = u ensures that the standard HJM fulfills the usual
Ritchen-Sankarasubramanian’s separability condition. By plugging the expression for the
volatility into Equation (11), it is possible to work out the expression ending up with the
representation
ln
(
k(T, x) + Ft(T, x)
k(T, x) + F0(T, x)
)
=
G∗(t, T − x, T ;T, x) ·
(
Xt + Yt ·
(
G0(t, t, T )− 1
2
G(t, T − x, T ;T, x)
))
, (14)
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where we have defined the stochastic vector process Xt and the auxiliary matrix process Yt
under Qh˜ as given by
Xt :=
N∑
k=1
∫ t
0
(hsg(s, t)) ·
(
dWs + hs
∫ t
s
dv g(s, v) ds
)
Yt :=
∫ t
0
ds (hsg(s, t)) · (hsg(s, t))
with X0 = 0 and Y0 = 0, as well as the vectorial deterministic functions
G0(t, T0, T1) :=
∫ T1
T0
dv g(t, v) , G(t, T0, T1;T, x) :=
∫ T1
T0
dv q(v;T, x)g(t, v)
It is worth noting that the integral representation of forward LIBOR volatilities given
by Equation (12), together with the common separability constraint given in Equation (13)
are sufficient conditions to ensure the existence of a reconstruction formula for all OIS and
LIBOR forward rates based on the very same family of Markov processes.
In order to model implied volatility smiles, we can add a stochastic volatility process to
our model. A tractable choice is to model the matrix process ht by means of a square-root
process as in Moreni and Pallavicini [2012]. In practice we set ht :=
√
vtR where R is a upper
triangular matrix, and the variance vt is a vector process whose dynamics under Q
h˜ measure
is given by
dvt = κ (θ − vt) dt+ ν√vt dZt , v0 = v¯
where κ,θ,ν,v¯ are constant deterministic vectors, and Zt is a vector of independent Brownian
motions correlated to the Wt processes as
ρij dt := d〈Zi,Wj〉t
where ρ is a deterministic correlation matrix.
We address the reader for calibration and pricing examples to Moreni and Pallavicini [2010]
for the cap/floor market, and to Moreni and Pallavicini [2012] for the swaption market.
4 Collateralization Policies: from partial collateralization to
CCPs
In the previous section we have seen that liquid instruments quoted on the money market
can be considered as fully collateralized. The HJM framework we have developed so far is
based on such assumption, and it allows us to calculate prices of fully-collateralized derivative
contracts. On the other hand, in practice we have often the need to evaluate uncollateralized
or partially-collateralized contracts, since many counterparties, in particular corporates or
smaller banks, may have difficulties to subscribe to standard CSA agreements, which require
a reserve of eligible assets to be used in the margining procedure. We need also to evaluate
over-collateralized deals when dealing with CCPs because of initial margin, as we shall see in
the following sections.
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4.1 Pricing Non-Perfectly-Collateralized Deals
When we trade an exotic interest-rate derivative contract we can hedge interest-rate risks by
going long or short in money-market liquid instruments. On the money market the liquid
contracts are usually collateralized on a daily basis at overnight rate as we have seen in
Section 3. Thus, whatever the collateralization procedure of the exotic contract is, we assume
to implement the hedging strategy by means of overnight collateralized contracts.
Hence, prices can be calculated by means of Equation (5), namely we have
V¯t(C;F ) = 1{τ>t}
∫ T
t
Eh˜t
[
dpiuD(t, u; f˜ + ζ˜)
∣∣F ]
where the risk factors grow at rate h˜, which is equal to the overnight rate et when the risk
factor is one of the money-market collateralized contracts (for instance the one-period OIS or
IRS). Notice that, in general, the collateral accrual rate c˜t, entering the pricing equation due
to the definition of ζ˜t given by Equation (4), may be different from the overnight rate et.
4.2 Convexity Adjustments for LIBOR Rates
We can apply the pricing formula (5) to evaluate the money market products we introduce in
the previous section, namely interest-rate swaps. Here, for example, we consider the par rate
F¯t(T, x; e) for a (partially-collateralized) single-period IRS. Such rate implicitly defined as
1{τ>t}E
h˜
t
[ (
xF¯t(T, x; e) − xLT−x(T )
)
D(t, T ; f˜ + ζ˜)
∣∣F ] = 0
The above definition can be simplified by moving to Qh˜,T ;e measure applying Equation (5).
1{τ>t}E
h˜,T ;e
t
[ (
xF¯t(T, x; e)− xLT−x(T )
)
D(t, T ; f˜ + ζ˜ − e)∣∣F ] = 0
leading for τ > t to
F¯t(T, x; e) :=
E
h˜,T ;e
t
[
LT−x(T )D(t, T ; q˜)
∣∣F ]
E
h˜,T ;e
t
[
D(t, T ; q˜)
∣∣F ] (15)
where we define the effective dividend rate
q˜t := f˜t + ζ˜t − et (16)
which includes the effects of credit risk, funding, and the mismatch in collateralization between
the exotic deal and the instruments used in its hedging strategy.
We can now express the par rates in term of collateralized LIBOR rates, we have for τ > t
F¯t(T, x; e) =
E
h˜,T ;e
t
[
LT−x(T )D(t, T ; q˜)
∣∣F ]
E
h˜,T ;e
t
[
D(t, T ; q˜)
∣∣F ]
=
E
h˜,T ;e
t
[
LT−x(T )
∣∣F ]Eh˜,T ;et [D(t, T ; q˜)∣∣F ]+Covh˜,T ;et [LT−x(T )D(t, T ; q˜) ]
E
h˜,T ;e
t
[
D(t, T ; q˜)
∣∣F ]
=
Ft(T, x; e)E
h˜,T ;e
t
[
D(t, T ; q˜)
∣∣F ]+Covh˜,T ;et [FT−x(T, x; e)D(t, T ; q˜) ]
E
h˜,T ;e
t
[
D(t, T ; q˜)
∣∣F ]
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leading to the following expression for partially collateralized LIBOR forward rates
F¯t(T, x; e) = Ft(T, x; e)(1 + γt(T, x; e)) (17)
where γt(T, x; e) is the partial collateralization convexity adjustment given by
γt(T, x; e) :=
Covh˜,T ;et [FT−x(T, x; e),D(t, T ; q˜) ]
Ft(T, x; e)E
h˜,T ;e
t
[
D(t, T ; q˜)
∣∣F ] . (18)
Hence, the price of a partially-collateralized one-period IRS contract paying a fix rate K
can be calculated as
V¯ IRSt := 1{τ>t}E
h˜
t
[
(xK − xLT−x(T ))D(t, T ; f˜ + ζ˜)
∣∣F ] (19)
= 1{τ>t} x
(
K − F¯t(T, x; e)
)
P¯t(T ; e)
where we have defined for convenience for τ > t the (partially) collateralized adjusted zero-
coupon bond as
P¯t(T ; e) := Pt(T ; e)E
h˜,T ;e
t
[
D(t, T ; q˜)
∣∣F ] (20)
These results can be straightforwardly extended to multi-period contracts.
Notice that partially collateralized zero-coupon bonds and forward rates depend on the
price process of the contract paying them. Thus, they have different values for different
contracts. We can interpret them respectively as a per-contract Z-spread-adjusted bonds and
convexity-adjusted forward rates. Thus, when collateralization is not perfect, we obtain that
each contract has its own curve.
4.3 Initial Margins and CCPs
Funding costs may arise also in collateralized contract, if they are closed with a Central Clear-
ing Counterparty (CCP). Indeed, CCP requires that counterparties post an initial margin to
close the deal. Along with the initial margin CCPs require also regular posting of collaterals
(variation margin) to match the mark-to-market variation of the deal. The analysis of the
impact of variation margin procedures can be found in Cont et al. [2011], where convexity
adjustments and NPV effects are discussed for different clearing houses. These two effects,
in the case of one-period contracts, correspond respectively to the adjustments of LIBOR
forward rates, given in Equation (17), and to the adjustment in zero-coupon bonds, given in
Equation (20). In this section, we focus on initial margins and their contribution to funding
costs.
Initial margins are collected to hedge potential future counterparty exposures resulting in
replacement costs. In particular, a CCP is vulnerable to losses on defaulting counterparty ex-
posures between the time of the last variation margin payment of the defaulting counterparty
and close-out valuation. This is known as margin period of risk, see Heller and Vause [2012].
Furthermore, initial margin may cover gap risks. Initial margins are calculated at contract
inception, and, then, possibly updated during the deal life-time. The amount of initial margin
can be estimated by a CCP according to Value-at-Risk or expected shortfall risk measure.
We can deal with initial margin by assuming that an over-collateralization is required
by the contract, namely we can generalize the argument leading to Equation(3) to allow for
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αt > 1. By a direct calculation starting from Equation (2) we obtain
V¯t(C;F ) = 1{τ>t}
∫ T
t
Eh˜t
[
dpiuD(t, u; f˜ + ξ˜)
∣∣F ] (21)
where we define
ξ˜t := (1− αt)+
(
λC<It LGDC1{V¯t(C;F )>0} + λ
I<C
t LGDI1{V¯t(C;F )<0}
)
(22)
+ (1− αt)−
(
λI<Ct LGDI1{V¯t(C;F )>0} + λ
C<I
t LGDC1{V¯t(C;F )<0}
)
− αt(f˜t − c˜t)
In the case 0 ≤ αt ≤ 1 we get back Equation (21) with ξ˜t replaced by ζ˜t.
In order to interpret the above result, we consider with a closer look the differences between
the partial, the perfect and the CCP collateralization cases.
• Partial collateralization, namely 0 ≤ αt < 1.
ξ˜t = (1− αt)
(
λC<It LGDC1{V¯t(C;F )>0} + λ
I<C
t LGDI1{V¯t(C;F )<0}
)
− αt(f˜t − c˜t)
The effective rate ξ˜t has three contributions: (i) a CVA term accounting for the non-
collateralized fraction of exposure, if positive; (ii) an analogous DVA term when expo-
sure is negative; (iii) a term accounting for collateral funding costs.
• Perfect collateralization, namely αt = 1.
ξ˜t = f˜t − c˜t
The effective rate ξ˜t has only one contribution: (i) a term accounting for collateral
funding costs.
• CCP collateralization, namely αt > 1.
ξ˜t = (1− αt)
(
λI<Ct LGDI1{V¯t(C;F )>0} + λ
C<I
t LGDC1{V¯t(C;F )<0}
)
− αt(f˜t − c˜t)
The effective rate ξ˜t has three contributions: (i) a DVA term accounting for the excess
of collateral to be given back to the CCP, if exposure is positive; (ii) an analogous
CVA term when exposure is negative (which can be discarded if we assume CCP being
default free); (iii) a term accounting for collateral funding costs. Notice than the first
two term are due to re-hypothecation, namely to the fact that the surviving party must
resort to an unsecured claim to get back the collateral excess. Indeed, if we repeat the
derivation of Equation (21) without the re-hypothecation hypothesis we obtain only the
third contribution.
5 Modelling Credit Spreads, Funding Rates and Collateral
Fractions
When pricing a partially-, non- or over-collateralized deal we have to define credit spreads and
funding rates. In the following sections we suggest how to write their dynamics. Our inten-
tion is to introduce simple yet realistic solutions which can be used to implement numerical
calculations.
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5.1 Credit Spreads and Gap Risk
The pricing equation is dependent on the future prices of deal, since CVA/DVA and invest-
ing/funding costs depend on their sign, so that we must resort to numerical tools to solve the
backward induction needed to calculate the price.
Yet, this is not the greatest problem with non-perfectly-collateralized deals. Indeed, the
real problem is that the market is incomplete. The term structure of credit spreads is usually
derived from CDS quotes, but we have no, or very few, informations from option markets.
Moreover, we should introduce model-dependent hypotheses as soon as we consider gap risk
into CDS evaluation to describe co-dependency of the default events for the counterparties
and the reference name of the CDS, as described in Brigo et al. [2011a]. Furthermore, gap risk
prevent from considering CDS contracts as fully collateralized, so that we should introduce
funding costs from the beginning of the calibration procedure.
In the practice such considerations are ignored and credit spreads are calibrated to CDS
contracts by considering them as fully-collateralized contracts, so that we could define the
credit-spread dynamics without introducing funding costs, along with some specification to
model the co-dependency between default events. Yet, the impact of such choice is to un-
derestimate the default probabilities coming from CDS quotes. For instance, in Fujii and
Takahashi [2011b] for stylized market settings the authors find a correction due to gap risk
on CDS spreads up to 10% at short maturities, and up to 50% at long maturities. Such
uncertainty should be compared to the uncertainty in recovery rates.
5.2 Funding Rates, Liquidity Policies and Collateral Portfolio
Even more problematic is the funding rate modelling.
Funding rates are determined by the Treasury department according to the Bank funding
policies. Thus, a term structure of funding rates is known, but it is far from being unam-
biguously derived from market quotes. For instance, long maturities in the term structure of
funding rates are calculated by rolling over short-term funding positions, and not by entering
into a long-term funding position. It is very difficult to forecast the future strategies followed
by the Treasury. Thus, the term structure of funding rates is model-depend. The option
market (e.g. contingent funding derivatives) is missing.
A tempting possibility is using the LIBOR rates as a proxy of funding rates. This choice
is widely spread, but it is very problematic, since it implies that the funding policies of
the Treasury department is based on inter-bank deposits (not to speak of possible frauds in
LIBOR published rates). After the crisis only a small part of funding comes from this source:
the main source of funding for an investment Bank is the collateral portfolio which is mainly
driven by the credit spreads of the underlying names.
Once a sensible model is defined for the funding policy we should consider that the Trea-
sury department may implement a maturity transformation policy along with a fund transfer
price (FTP) process. Such procedures may alter in a significant way the funding rate.
Here, we wish to select a sensible choice for the dynamics of funding and investing rates
to perform numerical simulations. A possibility is to use for the funding rate f+t an affine
combination of the investor’s default intensity λIt and the average default intensity λ
P
t of a
pool of financial names, representing the names underlying the collateral portfolio. Such an
average can be obtained from CDS quotes or from index proxies, such as i-Traxx financial
sub-index. While for the investing rate f−t we can use a different affine combination which
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includes only λPt . Thus, we can define the funding and investing rates as given by
f−t := et + w
−(t) + wP (t)λPt (23)
and
f+t := et + w
+(t) + wP (t)λPt + w
I(t)λIt (24)
where et is the overnight rate, and the w’s are deterministic functions of times, which can
be calibrated to Treasury data and bond/CDS basis. Moreover, the w’s define in an implicit
way the correlation between the funding/investing rates, the overnight rate and the default
intensities.
5.3 Collateral Fractions, Haircuts and Settlement Liquidity Risk
The last unknown process to be modelled is the collateral fraction. We consider three realistic
cases: (i) no collateralization, (ii) perfect collateralization, and (iii) CCP collateralization with
initial margin calculated with VaR risk measure. The first two cases are simply obtained by
setting respectively αt
.
= 0 and αt
.
= 1. The third case is more elaborated, since we should
assume
Ct := αtV¯t(C;F )
.
= V¯t(C;F )
+
(
−Q−V¯t(C;F )(q)
)+
1
{V¯t(C;F )>(−Q−V¯t(C;F )(q))
+
}
+
(
QV¯t(C;F )(q)
)−
1
{V¯t(C;F )<(QV¯t(C;F )(q))
−
}
leading to
αt
.
= 1 + ς+t (q) + ς
−
t (q) (25)
where we introduce the collateral haircuts ς±t (q) ∈ [0, 1) as given by
ς±t (q) := ∓
(Q∓V¯t(C;F )(q))
−
V¯t(C;F )
1{∓V¯t(C;F )<(Q∓V¯t(C;F )(q))
−} (26)
while the quantile function Q for a random variable X at a particular level q is defined as
QX(q) := inf{x : q < P {X < x }}
and P is the physical probability.
Yet, this approach can be difficult to follow within a risk-neutral pricing framework. Thus,
we suggest an alternative approach which focuses on prices instead of considering probabilities.
Such approach can be used to gauge the impact of funding the initial margin, but to exactly
match the algorithm used by the CCP we should resort to Equation (25).
The meaning of the haircuts ς±t (q), introduced starting from quantiles, is to cover the
surviving party from settlement liquidity risk, namely from the risk that the replacement
deal will be close some days after the default event, so that its mark-to-market may be
different from the loss evaluated at the default event.
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Yet, this protection can be easily achieved by means of (non-collateralized) call-like op-
tions. Indeed, we can write:
Ct
.
= 1{V¯t(C;F )>0}E
h˜
t
[
max{V¯t(C;F ), V¯t+δ(C;F )D(t, t+ δ; f˜)}
]
+ 1{V¯t(C;F )<0}E
h˜
t
[
min{V¯t(C;F ), V¯t+δ(C;F )D(t, t+ δ; f˜)}
]
= V¯t(C;F )
(
1 + Eh˜t
[(
V¯t+δ(C;F )D(t, t+ δ; f˜ )
V¯t(C;F )
− 1
)+ ])
where δ is the margin period of risk, see Brigo et al. [2011b], and can range from few days up
to 20 days. In term of collateral fraction we obtain
αt
.
= 1 + ςt (27)
where we introduce the collateral haircut ςt > 0 as given by
ςt := E
h˜
t
[(
V¯t+δ(C;F )D(t, t+ δ; f˜)
V¯t(C;F )
− 1
)+ ]
Then, in order to avoid non-realistic values for the collateral haircut, and to mimic the
quantile-dependent version, we choose the following definition which ensures ς ∈ [0, 1).
ςt := 1 +
(
Eh˜t
[(
V¯t+δ(C;F )D(t, t+ δ; f˜ )
V¯t(C;F )
− 1
)+ ]
− 1
)−
(28)
6 Conclusions and Further Developments
We model multiple LIBOR and OIS based interest rate curves consistently, based only on
market observables and by consistently including credit, collateral and funding effects. Further
work includes a more realistic model for initial margins in CCP’s, extending our analysis to gap
risk, collateralization in different currencies, and more realistic collateral processes inclusive
of minimum transfer amounts, thresholds and haircuts. Also, cases where collateral is not
cash can be considered.
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